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REPLY TO “RESPONSE: BOARD COMPOSITION AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH A 
SCEPTICAL VIEW” 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We thank the commentator (Chowdhury, 2010) for recognising the contribution of our 
study, and providing specific recommendations for our research.   In this response, the authors 
elucidate issues raised, and in doing, reproduce the results incorporating the commentator’s 
suggestions. We recognise Chowdhury has an economic discipline’s perspective on the 
accounting study, and argue that the contextual factors discussed in his reply do not necessarily 
impair the outcome of the Rashid et al (2010) paper.  
 
2.  POINTS OF CLARIFICATION  
2.1 Focus of the paper  
Chowdhury (2010) identifies the results of Rashid et al (2010) as complementing the 
findings of Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007), that the age and size of the board of directors do not 
have significant impact on corporate governance disclosures.  However, the authors clarify that a 
comparison of the findings cannot be drawn, because the focus of our research is examining a 
different aspect.  Rather than examining the impact of governance attributes on disclosure, 
Rashid et al (2010) examine the effect of board composition on firm performance.   
 
2.2 Limitation of Literature Review  
Chowdhury (2010), in acknowledging the comprehensive nature of the literature review, 
suggests that inclusion of studies on South Asian countries would improve the contribution of the 
study. The authors concur.  Regrettably, there is a dearth of published empirical studies on the 
impact of corporate governance on firm performance in South Asia in general, and specifically 
on the impact of corporate board composition and its effects on firm performance. Our research 
did not discover any directly comparable literature for South Asia.  However, there are limited 
more general studies such as Shah et al (2009), who investigate the earnings management 
motives of independent directors in Pakistan.  This is recognised as an area for further research.  
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2.3 Sample Size 
The authors thank the commentator for his observation in his first footnote, of 
inconsistent terminology regarding sample size.  We confirm that the sample size on page 77 of 
our paper should be 274 firm-years, consistent with page 76 and Table 1 on page 83.   
 
 
2.4 The model: theoretical underpinnings. 
Rashid et al (2010) make reference to established research on board composition and 
firm performance, premised on the tenets of agency theory.  These studies provide theoretical 
justification for the explanators of the model used in our study that targets the Bangladeshi 
context.  In this respect we refute the allegation our model is ad hoc with no theoretical 
underpinnings. 
 
2.5 The model: discussion of variables  
Chowdhury (2010) argues the regression model of Rashid et al (2010) may be 
misspecified, as it leaves out some important variables such as retained earnings and R&D 
expenditure, and that this will result in omitted variable bias (p. 104). Further, he suggests that 
the explanators used only capture the managerial aspects of the firm, and ignore demand-supply, 
innovation and technological aspects which also contribute to profit (Chowdhury 2010 p.105).   
 
The authors acknowledge these points.  In any linear regression model, many variables 
may be included. However, any study must put a limit to the number of variables, and make 
choices as to their relevance.  There is inevitably inherent bias as not all explanatory variables 
are known or can be incorporated. The authors chose the explanatory variables based upon those 
identified in the findings of previous literature (Rashid et al 2010 pp.84-85). The authors’ aim 
was to limit the independent variables within the corporate governance attributes, subject to 
availability of data. For example, while R&D is a recognised explanatory variable, many listed 
firms in Bangladesh do not appropriately disclose R&D expenditure in their disclosure 
documents, despite adopting a process of convergence with international accounting standards in 
1999 (see for example Mir and Rahman, 2005).  
 
Chowdhury (2010) suggests the Hausman test or Ramsy's RESET (Regression 
Specification Error Test) be run (p.108) to justify the appropriateness of the variables in the 
model.  The authors conducted the Ramsay's RESET by using E-Views to determine if additional 
variables could be fitted within the regression model (see Table 1). The results suggest while 
additional variables could be fitted within the Tobin’s Q model, this is not so for the ROA 
model. It is worthy to note that Ramsay's RESET does not suggest which variable(s) should be 
included and the inclusion of another variable into the model may even increase the bias.  
 
Acknowledging these limitations, we also conducted the 'omitted variable-likelihood 
ratio' test to determine whether the omitted variables ‘retained profit’ (as suggested Chowdhury 
2010), ‘firms growth’ and ‘firms risk’ (measured as Standard Deviation of movement of stock 
price per month or stock price volatility) play an important role in the Rashid et al (2010) model.  
From the results of the test in Table 1, the authors notice that, except for risk in ROA model, 
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inclusion of all of these variables did not play an important role in either of the models. Asteriou 
and Hall (2007 p.344) while mentioning the advantages of ‘panel data’ noted that, "the basic idea 
behind panel data analysis comes from the notion that the individual relationship will all have 
same parameters. This is sometimes known as pooling assumptions". They maintain that, if the 
pooling assumption is correct, the problem of omitted variables which may cause biased 
estimates in a single individual regression may not occur in a panel context. Because we have 
already conducted Ramsy's RESET and 'omitted variable-likelihood ratio', the CUSUM and 
CUSUM Square Test would be repetition and thus is not conducted. The preference for a 
dynamic model is contestable. 
 
Table 1: Diagnostics 
 Model F-
Statistics 
P- 
Value 
 
Ramsey RESET ROA 1.5227 0.2183  
 Tobin’s Q 9.8009 0.0000 *** 
Ramsey RESET ROA 9.865109 0.0019  
[after including Growth, Risk, and Retained Profit] Tobin’s Q 18.4319 0.0000 *** 
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Growth) ROA 0.040859 0.8400  
 Tobin’s Q 0.029430 0.8639 *** 
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Risk) ROA 20.07498 0.0000 *** 
 Tobin’s Q 39.62854 0.0000 *** 
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Retained Profit) ROA 2.237619 0.1359  
 Tobin’s Q 48.03429 0.0000 *** 
     * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.010; *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
2.6 Relationship between firm age and performance 
Chowdhury (2010) questions the inclusion of firm age as a control variable within Rashid 
et al’s (2010) model, arguing a “a non-monotonic relationship is implied between age of the firm 
and firm’s profitability” (p.105); “it may be misleading to relate profitability with the age of the 
firm” arguing that “older firms suffer from inertia and a failure to innovate and thus they 
degenerate into oblivion” (p.106). He further argues that the “over-concentration of family 
ownership control is the surest sign of a non-monotonic relationship between firm-age and 
profitability. For instance, the death of a family patriarch and/or falling-out among feuding 
family members often leads to disintegration within the firm management and adversely affects 
the profitability and viability of the firm” (pp.105-106). He subsequently mentions the examples 
Quasem Group of Companies, Ilias Brothers and the Partex Group of firms which experienced 
such a disintegration and/or division.  
 
The authors note that the relationship between firm age and performance has been clearly 
established in the literature (for example, Eisenberg el al. 1998; Majumdar and Chhibber 1999; 
Ang et al. 2000; Tian and Lau 2001; Harjoto, and Hoje 2008; Loderer and Waelchli 2009). 
Because of the possible influences of firm age on firm performance, many of these studies have 
included it as a control variable in their models. In his commentary on the relationship between 
firm age and firm performance, Chowdhury neglects to not distinguish between different 
corporate forms. Chowdhury’s (2010) arguments are based upon Private Limited Companies 
(which are not listed on any stock exchanges) and as such have a fundamentally different 
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governance structure and legal requirements to the firms included in the Rashid et al study, 
which is based on public limited companies listed on Bangladesh stock exchanges.  Private 
Limited Companies are not required to appoint outside independent directors, while publically 
listed companies are required to have outside independent directors. These companies have a 
formal accountability structure (have a formal board and management), hold annual general 
meetings, and prepare disclosure documents (subject to financial audit and scrutinized by the 
regulatory body Securities and Exchange Commission Bangladesh). A listed company and a 
private company have different ownership and oversight and an equivalent non-monotonic 
relationship cannot be inferred. Furthermore, the minimum firm age in Rashid et al (2010) is 8 
years (antilog of 2.079 from minimum LOGAGE in the descriptive statistics in p. 86). This 
indicates our sample firms have survived competition.  There is insufficient evidence to support 
Chowdhury’s (2010) argument for the impact of rent extraction.  Even if rent extraction by 
newer firms from older firms was occurring, the authors argue it cannot be inferred that there is 
no relationship between firm age and performance.  
 
 We have not provided the theoretical or statistical justification for transforming some 
variables into logarithms. We have done so to neutralize the variability in data and we have not 
proved the explanation as we assumed that readers will be aware of such practice. Rashid et al’s 
(2010) results are presented in Table 5.   
 
2.7 Composition of Error Term 
Chowdhury (2010) questions how homogeneity and independence are possible for firms 
in different industry groups in the sample (p.106). We have acknowledged this limitation within 
our paper (Rashid et al 2010 p.89). In this regard we again quote from Asteriou and Hall (2007): 
 
The basic idea behind panel data analysis comes from the notion that the 
individual relationship will all have same parameters. This is sometimes known 
as pooling assumptions as we are in effect pooling all the individual together 
into one dataset and imposing a common set of parameters across them (p.344). 
 
They further maintain that, if the pooling assumption is not correct, the panel is often 
referred to as a heterogeneous panel (as the parameters are different across the individuals). Even 
if this is the case, (except certain circumstances) it is normally expected the panel data estimator 
to give some representative estimate of the individual parameters. The only problem we have in 
our data is the violation of pooling assumptions, as we have used an unbalanced panel (as there 
are not 90 firms in all years) that may lead to 'unobserved heterogeneity'. 
 
In response to the reviewer regarding the issue of variation across the firms and within a 
firm (or firm specific characteristics) the authors carried out further analysis using a panel data 
model.  First, a Hausman Specification Test using E-Views was done to test the significance of 
the difference between the fixed effect estimates and the random effect estimates. The Chi 
Square (χ2) statistics and corresponding p- values of both the ROA and Tobin's Q model rejects 
the null hypothesis that random effects are consistent (see Table 2). As such the authors have 
now run the regression with a 'fixed effect model' (to capture the firm specific characteristics) 
under both ROA and Tobin’s Q models. The results of the ROA model are consistent with the 
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conclusion of the Rashid et al (2010) paper, that is, there is no significant relationship between 
board composition and firm economic performance in Bangladesh.  However, the results of the 
Tobin’s Q model in this test show that there is a significant negative relationship between board 
composition and firm performance.  This additional analysis strengthens our original finding that 
independent directors do not add potential economic value, by now suggesting that independent 
directors may even reduce potential economic value to firms in Bangladesh. 
 
Table 2: Board composition and firm performance 
This table presents the summary results of the board composition and firm performance under different performance 
measures. Column (a) and (b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables 
(Before capturing firm specific 
characteristics) 
Dependent Variables 
(After capturing firm specific 
characteristics) 
(a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q (a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q 
Intercept 
-0.078 
(-1.061) 
 
-1.798 
(-5.855) 
*** 
-0.206 
-0.602  
-7.896 
-7.646 
*** 
BDCOMP 
0.144 
(1.560) 
 
0.418 
(1.088) 
 
-0.152 
-0.890  
-1.195 
-2.312 
** 
DIROWN 
0.039 
(1.087) 
 
0.020 
(0.132) 
 
0.154 
0.723  
-0.451 
-0.701  
LOGBDSIZE 
-0.042 
(-1.724) 
* 
0.384 
(3.765) 
*** 
0.014 
0.204  
0.286 
1.345  
CEOD 
0.011 
(0.757) 
 
-0.110 
(-1.842) 
* 
-0.026 
-0.672  
0.035 
0.301  
DEBT 
-0.080 
(-6.356) 
*** 
0.886 
(16.966) 
*** 
-0.103 
-3.417 
*** 
1.123 
12.346 
*** 
LOGSIZE 
0.020 
(6.237) 
*** 
0.049 
(3.731) 
*** 
-0.027 
-2.922 
** 
0.024 
0.888  
LOGAGE 
0.045 
(1.934) 
* 
0.492 
(5.096) 
*** 
0.148 
1.283  
2.785 
8.000 
*** 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.302  0.586  0.585  0.888  
F-Statistic 
 
17.468 *** 54.887 *** 5.000 *** 23.554 *** 
Hausman Test ( 2χ )     27.3409  48.1144  
P-value     0.0003 *** 0.0000 *** 
 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.010; *** p < 0.001. 
 
 2.8 Sample Period  
Chowdhury (2010 p.107) questions the inclusion of the years 2007 and 2008 in our 
sample.  He identifies them as being ‘abnormal’ years for the Bangladesh economy and politics, 
because in 2007 there was both a Bangladesh military coup which established a military-backed 
caretaker government, and a severe flood followed by the devastating cyclone Sidr. 
 
 The authors are perplexed as to why Chowdhury identifies these factors as significant, 
but then provides contradictory evidence to this argument in his selection of a quotation from the 
Bangladesh Ministry of Finance (2009) which states “The economy of Bangladesh continue[s] to 
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demonstrate considerable resilience during FY 2008-09 despite the twin shocks arising from 
global recessions and the adverse effects of the consecutive floods and the cyclone-Sidr” (as 
cited in Chowdhury 2010 p.107). Floods and cyclones are very common in Bangladesh, and it is 
questionable whether such natural disasters have an abnormal impact on overall business 
activity.  Furthermore, while Chowdhury (2010 p.107) contends “business confidence was low 
and many businessmen ‘sat on their hands’ until the term of the caretaker government was over” 
he offers no evidence supporting his conclusion that business activity was in the doldrums.  
Indeed, this observation also is directly contradictory to evidence he later quotes referring to the 
FY 2008-09 “The economy is estimated to have grown at a rate of 5.9 percent, slightly below the 
growth rate (6.2 percent) of FY2007-08”. The two performance indicators (sales and Tobin’s Q) 
of the sample firms over 2008-09 also indicate that the overall performance is not abnormally 
low during the “abnormal” 2007-08 period.  Refer Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Average Sample Firm Performance 2000-2009 
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Institutional context is pivotal to the variables and sample size selected.  Mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures were introduced in 2006 by Bangladesh’s Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  A period of 2005-09 was selected for this study to capture the possible 
impact over the period of this specific regulatory change.  This point was missed by the 
commentator. 
 
Chowdhury (2010) argues that the Corporate Governance Notification 2006 (CGN) for 
the appointment of outside independent directors was issued on 20 January 2006 and its effect 
will only be known after a lag. In the Rashid et al (2010) sample, 10 firms have outside directors 
even before the CGN 2006 was issued. All other firms in the sample acknowledged their 
obligation, which is evident from their disclosure documents by their respective year end. It is 
contended the period is sufficient to capture any lag. The firms whose financial years end on 30 
January had almost 6 months lag, while the firms whose years end on 31 December had almost 
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one year lag. Furthermore, although the condition of such appointment was not mandatory, non-
compliance requires mandatory disclosure in the Director’s Report as per schedule 5.00 of the 
CGN 2006, by order of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh. 
 
2.9  Results 
Chowdhury (2010 p.108) contends an emphasis is placed on the statistical significance of 
the coefficient in arriving at the conclusions, while ignoring its magnitude. The study found the 
coefficient BDCOMP was positive but not statistically significant. Contrary to Chowdhury 
positing that “the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of BDCOMP is substantial (0.144 and 
0.418 respectively)”, the impact of an increase in this variable on firm performance is minute (an 
increase of 0.118 (one standard deviation) in this variable is associated with mere 0.0118 
increase in ROA and 0.0343 on Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the coefficient of BDCOMP in our results 
is neither statistically significant (i.e. not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a 
relationship between board composition and firm performance) nor practically significant.     
Chowdhury (2010) also suggests running a diagnostic test for heteroscedasticity, and a 
Jarque-Bera Test for normality. A Breusch–Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test was conducted through E-
Views. This test confirms the presence of heteroscedasticity. It is noted that heteroscedasticity is 
very common in panel data (Asteriou and Hall 2007). Wrigley (1977 p.13) states 
“heteroscedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates, but it does result in a loss of 
efficiency”. Despite heteroscedasticity, OLS estimators are linear, unbiased and are (under 
general conditions) in large samples, normally distributed (Gujarati 2003 p.427).  It is argued 
that "heteroscedasticity has never been a reason to throw out an otherwise good model" (Mankiw 
1990 p.1648); "unequal error variance is worth correcting only when the problem is severe" (Fox 
1997 p.306); and "unless heteroscedasticity is very severe, one may not abandon OLS in favour 
of GLS or WLS" (Gujarati 2003 p.400). Despite these considerations, we ran the regressions by 
using the correction techniques of White (1980) for unknown heteroscedasticity. The results 
show a change for the ROA performance measure, significant only at the 10% level. Refer Table 
3 below. 
 
Table 3: Board composition and firm performance under different performance measures  
This table presents the summary results of the board composition and firm performance under different performance 
measures. Column (a) and (b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables 
(Before correcting for 
heteroscedasticity) 
Dependent Variables 
(After correcting for 
heteroscedasticity) 
(a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q (a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q 
Intercept 
-0.078 
(-1.061) 
 
-1.798 
(-5.855) 
*** 
-0.102 
-1.070  
-1.824 
-6.265 
*** 
BDCOMP 
0.144 
(1.560) 
 
0.418 
(1.088) 
 
0.146 
1.883 * 
0.414 
1.306 
 
DIROWN 
0.039 
(1.087) 
 
0.020 
(0.132) 
 
0.031 
0.798  
0.008 
0.048 
 
LOGBDSIZE 
-0.042 
(-1.724) 
* 
0.384 
(3.765) 
*** 
-0.029 
-0.829  
0.415 
4.301 
*** 
CEOD 
0.011 
(0.757) 
 
-0.110 
(-1.842) 
* 
0.008 
0.689  
-0.117 
-2.187 
** 
DEBT 
-0.080 
(-6.356) 
*** 
0.886 
(16.966) 
*** 
-0.065 
-1.285  
0.914 
21.396 
*** 
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LOGSIZE 
0.020 
(6.237) 
*** 
0.049 
(3.731) 
*** 
0.018 
5.884 *** 
0.046 
3.882 
*** 
LOGAGE 
0.045 
(1.934) 
* 
0.492 
(5.096) 
*** 
0.046 
2.795 ** 
0.483 
4.460 
*** 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.302  0.586  0.286  0.641  
F-Statistic 
 
17.468 *** 54.887 *** 16.636 *** 70.761 *** 
 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.010; *** p < 0.001. 
 
The normality assumption requires that observations should be normally distributed in 
the population. Coakes and Steed (2001) argue that the violations of this assumption are of little 
concern, when the sample size is large (greater than 30). There were 90 firms in the sample and 
the assumption of normality is confirmed through a Normal Q-Q Plot. The Residual 
Test/Histogram-Normality Test of alls equations produced a 'bell shape'. Normality was also 
checked by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. Both tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis of normality (at p <0.001). Also carried out was the Jarque-Bera test (Table 4), using 
E-Views. It also does not reject the null hypothesis of normality (as p <0.001 in most cases). 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
Probability 
ROA 0.057 -1.494 0.287 0.132 -6.278 69.833  55270.08  0.000 
Tobin’s Q 1.290 0.335 6.226 0.769 2.566 9.873  1372.42  0.000 
BDCOMP 0.109 0.000 0.333 0.082 -0.077 -0.751  8.126  0.017 
DIROWN 0.423 0.000 0.960 0.190 0.069 0.423  2.065  0.356 
LOGBDSIZE 1.857 1.099 2.485 0.304 -0.269 -0.102  3.530  0.171 
CEOD 0.416 0.000 1.000 0.494 0.344 -1.896  45.921  0.000 
DEBT 0.774 0.073 5.619 0.629 4.061 22.483  6266.395  0.000 
SIZE 5.459 -4.200 10.724 2.398 -0.937 1.132  53.172  0.000 
AGE 2.858 2.079 3.466 0.312 -0.082 -0.836  8.686  0.012 
 
Although it is not mentioned in Chowdhury (2010), we would like to address the possible 
presence of endogeneity (the relationship between the independent variable with the error term) 
in our model. In the presence of endogeneity OLS estimates can be biased and inconsistent.  
While the endogeneity is an important factor, it is not fatal in doing empirical corporate 
governance research (Denis 2001 p.198). Despite this consideration, we have checked the 
possible presence of endogeneity in our model by carrying out a Hausman test. The output of the 
Hausman test suggests that both the OLS and IVs are consistent.  
 
 
3.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Rashid et al (2010 p.88) concluded that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between board composition in the form of representation of outside independent directors and 
firm performance, implying that the outside independent directors did not add potential 
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economic value to the firm in Bangladesh.  This conclusion is based upon the results shown in 
Table 5 (p.88). Although BDCOMP coefficient found in Rashid et al (2010) is not statistically 
significant, its positive sign is consistent with the literature presented (pp.77-82) which 
demonstrates independent directors positively contribute to performance through good 
monitoring of management.   
 
Chowdhury (2010 p.108) argued that “I am not sure how the authors can claim that 
external independent directors are ‘good monitors’ as this has not been tested in this paper”.  
However, in referring to our results he states “design of the β1 is POSITIVE indicating the 
independent directors’ positive contribution to profitability; however, this substantial positive 
contribution of independent directors is rejected by the authors on the grounds of its statistical 
significance”.  In Chowdhury’s own admission, we have tested the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance, a well recognised indicator of good monitoring in corporate 
governance literature (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Luan and Tang, 2007; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Kaymak and Bektas, 2008).  
 
While acknowledging the potential contribution of a “properly specified econometric 
model” (Chowdhury 2010 p.108), the authors contend studies in the accounting discipline are 
artefacts of temporal contextual and social processes (Hines 1988). Acknowledging the 
limitations of a modelling tool, the authors see the contribution of this study as an exploration of 
the circumstance of a developing economy.  In a practical sense generalisability in the form of a 
specified model is neither sought nor possible.   
    
Based on the above analytical presentation, we question the strengths of Chowdhury 
(2010) criticisms and argue that the factors discussed in Chowdhury (2010) do not necessarily 
impair the outcome of Rashid et al (2010) paper. This study seeks to contribute to the increasing 
literature by recognizing the interests of readers to gain more insight and understanding of 
empirical corporate governance research, with special reference to the Bangladesh context.  
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